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 TORT AND EVIDENCE LAW—A SPHINX  WITHOUT A  SECRET: 
THE  COLLATERAL  SOURCE  RULE AND  MANDATORY  HEALTH  IN­
SURANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
INTRODUCTION 
“My dear Gerald,” I answered, “Lady Alroy was simply a woman 
with a mania for mystery.  She took these rooms for the pleasure 
of going there with her veil down, and imagining she was a hero­
ine.  She had a passion for secrecy, but she herself was merely a 
Sphinx without a secret.”1 
Just like Oscar Wilde’s Lady Alroy in her chambers, in court­
rooms all over the country, the parties’ insurance has been jealously 
enshrouded in secrecy.2  And, of course, so have been insurance 
payments.3  By virtue of the so-called “collateral source rule,”4 
courts generally do not allow evidence of third party payments in 
personal injury cases.5  There are several justifications for the rule, 
discussed in Part I of this Note. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the collat­
eral source rule in the recent case Law v. Griffith.6  There, the 
plaintiff was injured in a car accident, caused by the defendant, Mr. 
Griffith, against whom the court entered a judgment.7  The Griffith 
court did not admit evidence of the actual insurance payments for 
1. OSCAR  WILDE, THE  SPHINX  WITHOUT A  SECRET 84-85 (A.R. Keller & Co., 
Inc. 1907). Wilde’s protagonist, Lord Murchison, was in love with Lady Alroy, a myste­
rious woman, whose puzzling behavior he was trying to unravel after her sudden death. 
When going to an apartment, which his beloved used to visit in disguise, he was told 
that the lady did not do anything unusual there but read books and have tea.  It turned 
out that, despite the air of mystery she had surrounded herself with, she had nothing to 
hide. 
2. See FED. R. EVID. 411 (stating that evidence that a person charged with negli­
gence does or does not have liability insurance is inadmissible); Mangan v. Broderick & 
Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24, 30 (7th Cir. 1965) (finding that defense counsel’s men­
tioning of the fact that the plaintiff carried workman’s compensation was prejudicial). 
See generally JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 13:14 (3d ed. 
2010) (discussing the limited admissibility of evidence of collateral sources). 
3. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Mass. 2010) (ruling that collateral 
source payments are inadmissible in evidence). 
4. See infra Part I. 
5. STEIN, supra note 2, § 13:14. 
6. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129; see infra Part II. 
7. Law v. Griffith, No. 03-3179, 2006 WL 6482934 at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 24, 
2006), rev’d, 930 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010). 
619 
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620 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
the medical services rendered to the plaintiff.8  However, it admit­
ted evidence of the victim’s medical bills, as well as a range of pay­
ments accepted by the victim’s health care provider.9  The problem 
in that case, and a main focus of this Note, is the huge discrepancy 
between the amount the provider billed the victim and the amount 
it accepted as a payment in full.10  The difference between those 
two figures—attributable to the deeply discounted rate the victim’s 
insurer had negotiated with the provider11—was almost ninety-six 
thousand dollars.12  Presented with those two numbers and all the 
numbers in between, the jury would have to determine the “fair and 
reasonable” charge for the service rendered by the health care pro­
vider.13  The jury would not be aware of how much was actually 
paid on behalf of the victim.  Neither would it know who, if anyone, 
had paid her medical bills; the plaintiff’s health insurance would be 
discreetly kept out of the picture.14  However, health insurance in 
Massachusetts can hardly be a secret, since it is actually an obliga­
tion.15  Therefore, trying to conceal it is just as pointless as Lady 
Alroy hiding in her room. 
This Note will argue that in the Commonwealth of Massachu­
setts the collateral source rule, as applied to health insurance reim­
bursement, is outdated and is more harmful than beneficial.  Part I 
of this Note will provide an overview of the notion of compensation 
in negligence cases and will explain the origins and the purpose of 
the collateral source rule.  Part II will discuss the reasons for the 
discrepancy between medical bills and insurance write-offs, and 
their application in Law v. Griffith.  Part III will touch upon the 
current tendency toward abrogation of the collateral source rule in 
various other states.  Part IV will discuss what makes Massachusetts 
unique with regard to health insurance. Finally, Part V will analyze 
the shortcomings of the collateral source rule and will propose that 
the state legislature abrogate the rule as applied to medical pay­
8. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. (stating that the provider accepted $16,387.14 in lieu of a $112,269.94 bill). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. (discussing the standard for recovery of medical expenses in negligence 
cases). 
14. See id. (ruling that collateral source payments are irrelevant and therefore, 
inadmissible). 
15. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(a) (2010) (indicating that with very nar­
row exceptions, heath insurance is required for Massachusetts residents). 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 621 
ments by health insurance companies, and make such evidence 
available at trial. 
I. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND THE
 
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
 
The purpose of compensation for damages is to place the tort 
victim in a position that he would have been in had the wrong not 
occurred.16  In general, the victim is not expected to make a profit 
on compensatory damages.17  However, in certain instances, exces­
sive recovery is acceptable as an incidental effect of furthering an­
other major goal of the tort system—deterrence from 
wrongdoing.18  It is considered that in order to effectively discour­
age a tortious act, the wrongdoer should be required to pay the full 
amount of the damage she has caused,19 even if that payment 
amounts to overcompensation.20  One of the instances where the 
tort system allows the victim double recovery is when the victim has 
another source of payment for her injury.  In such circumstances 
the collateral source rule comes into play.21 
According to the collateral source rule, any “[p]ayments made 
to . . . the injured party from other sources are not credited against 
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) (stating “the law of 
torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible 
equivalent to his position prior to the tort”). 
17. See Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 693 n.30 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Un­
like punitive damages that are intended to punish and deter, compensatory damages are 
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct.” (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003))) (internal quotation marks omitted); Westric Battery Co. v. 
Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307, 1318 (10th Cir. 1973) (“Appellant is entitled to be 
compensated for losses attributable to the injury inflicted, but it is not entitled to earn a 
profit”) (emphasis added); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 21 (2010) (“Compensatory damages are 
damages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered and 
thereby make him or her whole. The purpose of awarding compensatory damages is not 
to enable the injured party to make a profit on the transaction”) (emphasis added) (foot­
note omitted). 
18. See generally 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE  LAW  OF  TORTS 19 (2000) (stating that 
courts have recognized the deterrence from conduct that may lead to tort liability is 
another aim of tort law). 
19. Id. (stating that tort law “deter[s] certain kinds of conduct by imposing liabil­
ity when that conduct causes harm”). 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TORTS § 920A(2) cmt. b (1979). “The injured 
party’s net loss may have been reduced correspondingly, and to the extent that the 
defendant is required to pay the total amount there may be a double compensation for a 
part of the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. (emphasis added). 
21. Id. 
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622 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
the tortfeasor’s liability.”22  The rule encompasses any kind of com­
pensation from third parties, such as insurance policies,23 employ­
ment benefits,24 gratuities (both in cash and in free-of-charge 
services),25 and social legislation benefits such as pensions, social 
security, or welfare.26 
The collateral source rule is an English common law rule27 and 
its application in the United States dates back to the nineteenth 
century case The Propeller Monticello v. Mollision.28 Monticello in­
volved a collision between a propeller and a schooner, resulting in 
total loss of the schooner and its cargo.29  The United States Su­
preme Court held the owner of the propeller responsible, refusing 
to consider the fact that the schooner was insured,30 and ordered 
that the defendant pay to the owner of the schooner the full value 
of the vessel and the lost cargo.31 
In the context of personal injury, the collateral source rule 
means that payments made by the victim’s health insurance will not 
be considered when assessing the compensation that the tortfeasor 
will have to pay.32  Therefore, if A negligently causes B an injury, 
under the collateral source rule, even if B is treated for free or his 
insurance pays for his treatment, A will be liable for the exact same 
amount as if B’s injury were never covered. The underlying pre­
sumption of the rule is that if a potential wrongdoer were liable to 
the victim for the full monetary value of his injury, the wrongdoing 
would be less likely to materialize.33  Courts recognize that the ap­
plication of the rule may result in overcompensating, but assert that 
this is acceptable in cases where not allowing excessive recovery 
would mean a “windfall” for the tortfeasor.34 
22. Id. at § 920A(2). 
23. Id. at § 920A cmt. c(1). 
24. Id. at § 920A cmt. c(2). 
25. Id. at § 920A cmt. c(3). 
26. Id. at § 920A cmt. c(4). 
27. Id. at § 920A cmt. d. 
28. The Propeller Monticello v. Mollision, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 155 (“The contract with the insurer is in the nature of a wager between 
third parties, with which the trespasser has no concern.”). 
31. Id. 
32. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) (quoting Goldstein v. 
Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974)) (stating that “jurors might be led by the 
irrelevancy” of the third party payment and deny recovery for the plaintiff); Corsetti v. 
Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 802 (Mass. 1985). 
33. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132. 
34. Id. (“[A]voiding a windfall to a tortfeasor is preferable even if a plaintiff 
thereby receives an excessive recovery in some circumstances.”); Pipkins v. TA Operat­
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 623 
A. Rationale for the Collateral Source Rule 
The collateral source rule has a dual function: it is both an evi­
dentiary rule and a rule of damages.35  Thus, its two main justifica­
tions center around those two functions—ensuring that the 
tortfeasor will pay an adequate award for the damages he caused, 
and that the jury has an adequate basis for calculating that award. 
1. A Windfall to the Victim—the Lesser of Two Evils 
The collateral source rule is based on the belief that a windfall 
for one of the parties is inevitable: either the plaintiff will get more 
than necessary to make him whole, by recovering both from the 
tortfeasor and from another source, or the tortfeasor will pay less 
than the full amount of the damages he or she caused.  Indeed, the 
rationale is: 
[R]educing recovery by the amount of the benefits received by 
the plaintiff would grant a windfall to the defendant by allowing 
a credit for the reasonable value of those benefits.  Such credit 
would result in the benefits being effectively directed to the 
tortfeasor and from the intended party—the injured plaintiff.  If 
there is a windfall, it is considered more just that the injured per­
son profit rather than grant the wrongdoer relief from full re­
sponsibility for the wrongdoing.36 
Analyzed that way, it may seem more reasonable that the victim, 
not the wrongdoer, reaps the benefit from having health insurance 
even if it leads to overcompensation.37 
2. Avoiding Jury Confusion 
Another common justification for disallowing collateral source 
payments into evidence is the belief that the jury would not award 
the portion of the compensation covered by the collateral source.38 
Courts have ruled that this phenomenon would have several perni­
ing Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1262 (D.N.M. 2006) (“[A]ny windfall arising from the 
collateral source rule should benefit the plaintiff, and not the tortfeasor.”); Lopez v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 491-92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). 
35. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 127; Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455, 457 
(Fla. 1991). 
36. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 392 (2003). 
37. See Corsetti, 483 N.E.2d at 802; Pipkins, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (noting that, 
under New Mexico law, “any windfall arising from the collateral source rule should 
benefit the plaintiff, and not the tortfeasor”); Lopez, 129 P.3d at 491-92. 
38. See Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974) (stating that “ju­
rors might be led by the irrelevancy” of the third party payment and deny recovery for 
the plaintiff). 
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624 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
cious effects.  For one, the defendant would pay less than the rea­
sonable value for the treatment of the injury she caused.39 
Additionally, the plaintiff would receive an unjustly reduced award 
and thereby would be, in effect, “punished” for having purchased 
insurance.40  The insurer would lose its right to recover the amount 
it paid, which would ultimately result in a rise in insurance premi­
ums.41  For all these reasons, many courts have refused to allow any 
evidence of the presence or lack of collateral source payments.42 
Conversely, evidence of third party payments has been allowed 
in limited circumstances, where such evidence has been necessary 
to rebut misleading testimony by the plaintiff.43  Once the plaintiff 
affirmatively leads the jury to believe that he has not received any 
third party benefits, evidence of such payments becomes 
admissible.44 
39. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132. 
40. See Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66-67 (Cal. 1970). 
If we were to permit a tortfeasor to mitigate damages with payments from 
plaintiff’s insurance, plaintiff would be in a position inferior to that of having 
bought no insurance, because his payment of premiums would have earned no 
benefit.  Defendant should not be able to avoid payment of full compensation 
for the injury inflicted merely because the victim has had the foresight to pro­
vide [herself] with insurance. 
Id. 
41. 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1059. 
42. See Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1991); Wills v. 
Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1022-23 (Ill. 2008); Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc 233 P.3d 
205, 235 (Kan. 2010); Griffith, 930 N.E.2d, at 131-32; Leitinger v. Van Buren Mgmt., 
Inc., 720 N.W.2d 152, 158 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
43. See Lange v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 703 F.2d 322, 323-24 (8th Cir. 1983) (the plaintiff 
falsely testified he had no disability insurance and had to return to work immediately 
after his surgery); York v. Young, 608 S.W.2d 20, 21. 
(Ark. 1980) (the plaintiff, who had collision coverage, claimed he could not afford to 
have his vehicle repaired); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 801-03 (Mass. 1985) 
(the plaintiff claimed he was impoverished due to his joblessness, caused by his injury, 
whereas he received more in compensation after his injury than he used to make while 
working); Jojola v. Baldridge Lumber Co., 635 P.2d 316, 320 (N.M. Ct. App.1981) (the 
plaintiff exaggerated the gravity of his financial troubles caused by his injury, leading 
the jury to believe he received no compensation at all).  In all of those cases evidence 
for collateral source payments was allowed, despite the fact that the respective jurisdic­
tions recognize the collateral source rule. 
44. Jackson v. Beard, 255 N.E.2d 837, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (stating that “[t]he 
[plaintiff] having opened the gate on the matter of reduced income as a result of the 
collision complained of” defeated the collateral source rule and gave the defendant’s 
counsel the right to cross-examine the plaintiff on the issue). 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 625 
B. Excessive Recovery and Subrogation Rights of the Insurers 
Opponents of the collateral source rule often criticize it on the 
grounds that it allows “double dipping” by the plaintiff.45  However, 
the notion of “double recover[y]”46 is somewhat of a misnomer be­
cause generally health insurance companies are entitled to recuper­
ate their payments from the award plaintiff receives.47  In this 
respect, the victim does not necessarily recover twice for the same 
injury because he pays back the benefits received from the collat­
eral party. 
Understandably, the insurer is entitled solely to the amount it 
paid and not the full amount received by the plaintiff.48  Therefore, 
in situations where the amount recovered from the tortfeasor is 
greater than the amount the insurer paid, there is a sum that theo­
retically belongs to no one.  It does not belong to the insurance 
company, because the company has already recouped what it 
paid.49  The health care provider is not entitled to it, because the 
provider is bound by its contract with the insurance company to 
render services at certain negotiated rate50 and getting more than 
the agreed upon price would be a violation of that agreement.51 
The tortfeasor cannot get it back, because she, presumably, paid no 
more than the “fair and reasonable charge” of the injury she in­
flicted.52  The victim does not owe it, because his treatment was al­
45. See Michael W. Cromwell, Note, Cutting the Fat Out of Healthcare Costs: Why 
Medicare and Medicaid Write-Offs Should Not Be Recoverable Under Oklahoma’s Col­
lateral Source Rule, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 585, 590 (2010); see also  RESTATEMENT (SEC­
OND) OF TORTS § 920 A(1) cmt. b (1979) (stating “to the extent that the defendant is 
required to pay the total amount there may be a double compensation for a part of the 
plaintiff’s injury . . .”) (emphasis added). 
46. Cromwell, supra note 45, at 590. 
47. 44A AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1785 n.2 (2010). 
48. See generally Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, Improperly Divorced from Its 
Roots: The Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare 
and Medicaid Write-Offs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 469-70 (2007) (discussing principle of 
subrogation). 
49. Id. 
50. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 129 n.3 (Mass. 2010) (explaining the na­
ture of MassHealth); see also 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2010) (stating that Medicaid dis­
counted payments should be accepted as payment in full by the provider); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 18 § 5H (2010) (stating that “[p]ayment by the department under the medical 
assistance program shall constitute payment in full . . .[.]  [A] provider may not recover 
from any health insurer an amount greater than the amount so paid.”). 
51. See Sylvestre v. Martin, No. SUCV2003-05988, 2008 WL 82631, at *2 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2008) (citing Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 425 N.E.2d 313, 316 
(Mass. 1981) (discussing the restrictions on “balance billing”–charging the insured the 
difference between the provider’s full charge and the discount rate)). 
52. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 128 (internal quotations omitted). 
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626 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
ready covered.  But the victim is also the only party in this entire 
scheme who, if awarded the extra money, would not be profiting 
from another party’s contract.53  The reason is that, if the tortfeasor 
does not have to pay the difference between the “reasonable” value 
of the treatment and the written-off payment, the tortfeasor will be 
profiting from the victim’s contract with his health insurance com­
pany and from the agreement between the health insurer and the 
medical provider.  Since the victim is the one who purchased (or 
otherwise received) his health insurance, courts have considered it 
to be the least unjust outcome for the victim to receive the differ­
ence between the cost incurred and the price paid.54 
In this regard, the victim does not get compensated twice for 
the same expense, but receives a larger amount than the one the 
insurance company paid on his behalf.  Often this amount is negligi­
ble,55 or in some circumstances may serve to offset costs the victim 
was not compensated for.56  In other situations, however, it may 
lead to quite striking results.57  Such situations are those involving 
health insurance write-offs.58 
53. See id. at 132 (asserting that defendant is not to benefit from victim’s health 
insurance contract); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS 18 § 5H (2010) (saying that a health care 
provider shall accept the negotiated rate as payment in full). 
54. See Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 491-92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); 
Pipkins v. TA Operating Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1262 (D.N.M. 2006); Goldstein v. 
Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974); Shea v. Rettie, 192 N.E. 44 (Mass. 1934). 
Shea was cited in Griffith in support of the assertion that it would be unfair if the 
tortfeasor benefits from the victim’s insurance. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132 (citing Shea, 
192 N.E. at 45-46). 
55. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1058 (stating that “overcompensation is often 
more theoretical than real”). 
56. Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule: 
Seeking Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Award, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 210 
(2009) (stating that one of the justifications of the collateral source rule is that the extra 
funds are used to offset attorney fees); see also The Legal Pad, The Beauty of Double-
Dipping, THE  BLOG OF  CALLAW.COM (April 21, 2006, 3:47 pm), http://legalpad.word 
press.com/2006/04/21/double-dipping/ (stating that a tort victim, who was also an attor­
ney, asserted: “[t]he trial judge recognized that part of the reason for the collateral 
source rule is to offset all the deductions that get taken from the judgment before it 
finally gets to the plaintiff’s pocket”). 
57. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129 (provider accepted $16,387.14 in lieu of a $112, 
269.94 bill). 
58. A “write-off” is the difference between the amount billed by a medical pro­
vider and the amount the provider agrees to accept as payment in full for the same 
service. See Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ohio 2006); see also discussion 
infra Part II. 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 627 
II. MEDICAL BILLS, HEALTH INSURANCE WRITE-OFFS, AND
 
LAW V. GRIFFITH59
 
At first glance, there is nothing striking about the Griffith case. 
The facts and the procedural posture are fairly straightforward, and 
the real difficulty of the case does not become apparent until the 
damages determination stage.  When Joanne Law was injured in a 
car accident, she went to the hospital, received medical treatment, 
and MassHealth60 promptly paid the bill.  She sued the driver of the 
vehicle that caused her injuries, and recovered $28,556.50 as com­
pensation for that same treatment.61  Subsequently, Ms. Law ap­
pealed and sought to introduce the actual hospital bill totaling 
$112,269.90 as evidence of the “fair and reasonable charge”62 for 
her medical service, despite the fact that neither she nor 
MassHealth paid that sum.63  The defendant, on the other hand, 
wanted to present the jury with the actual amount paid, 
$16,387.14.64  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court allowed 
the bill but excluded from evidence the actual payment.65  As the 
case was ultimately settled,66 it is unclear how much the jury would 
have awarded on remand.  If the plaintiff had received the full 
amount of the bill, MassHealth would have been able to get its 
$16,387.14 back67 and Ms. Law would have kept the remaining 
$95,882.7668 in addition to all the other compensatory damages she 
59. See infra Part IV.2 (discussing the procedural posture of Griffith). 
60. MassHealth is a public health insurance plan for qualifying low-income Mas­
sachusetts residents. See HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/ 
gov/departments/masshealth/ (last visited May 24, 2012). This Note does not consider 
any differences between private and public health insurance. 
61. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129.  The jury awarded initially $48 500 but found Ms. 
Law twenty-five percent liable for her own injury.  As a result of the plaintiff’s contrib­
utory negligence, the judge reduced her award by $12,125.  Further, the award was re­
duced by $7,818.50 due to compensation the plaintiff had already received. Id. 
62. See id. at 130 (discussing the standard for recovery of medical expenses in 
negligence cases). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. The Massachusetts Supreme Court remanded the case to trial court on the 
sole issue of appropriate damages. Id. at 136.  In a phone call to the Essex County 
Superior Court, the author was informed that the case was subsequently settled for an 
undisclosed amount. Id. 
67. See Zorogastua, supra note 48, at 469 (discussing the principle of subrogation, 
stating that “[t]hrough subrogation, a third party pays the plaintiff’s debt and then ‘re­
ceives’ the plaintiff’s rights and remedies”).  In the given context, where MassHealth 
has paid for the plaintiff’s medical bills on her behalf, it is entitled to receive the com­
pensation for those bills subsequently received by the tortfeasor. 
68. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132. 
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would have received.  In this scenario she would have essentially 
been awarded almost six times the amount that her insurer paid on 
her behalf, all tax-free.69 
The substantial difference between the medical bills and the 
amount accepted as payment in full comes from the discrepancy 
between the “full price” of a medical service juxtaposed with the 
so-called insurance “write-offs.”70  In effect, the only patients who 
pay the list price are the uninsured,71 who have never had the 
chance to negotiate for discount rates with the medical providers in 
the manner insurance companies do.72  Often medical providers ac­
cept exceptionally low payments from insurance companies while 
off-setting the losses they incur by raising the cost for the unin­
sured.73  In certain instances, as in Griffith, the health care provider 
would accept as payment in full as little as one seventh of the 
amount of the bill submitted.74  In effect, the collateral source rule 
allows the victim of negligence to recover that difference. Those 
disparities between the amount charged and the compensation re­
ceived have prompted many states to reevaluate the reasonableness 
of the collateral source rule at present time. 
III. COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM 
Perceived sometimes as an “oddit[y] of American accident 
law,”75 the collateral source rule has been criticized by legal schol­
69. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006) (excluding “physical personal injuries” from 
taxable income). 
70. See Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ohio 2006) (stating that a 
“write-off” is the difference between the amount billed by a medical provider and the 
amount the provider agrees to accept as payment in full for the same service). 
71. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 133. 
72. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Con­
tracts and the New Medical Market Place, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 645 (2008). 
73. Id. at 645 (stating that “insurers aggressively negotiate rates for plan mem­
bers; uninsured patients must ‘bargain’ individually with providers who are determined 
to recoup what they bargained away to insurers”); see also Alicia Curtis, The Reasona­
ble Value of Medical Services: A Hospital Bill, the Insurer’s Payment, or the Jury’s 
Choice?, 23 ME. B.J. 78, 78 (2008) (discussing the complexity of the calculation of the 
value of a treatment in the “distorted market for medical services”); James McGrath, 
Overcharging the Uninsured in Hospitals: Shifting a Greater Share of Uncompensated 
Medical Care Costs to the Federal Government, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 173, 175-76 
(2007) (discussing the free market approach toward medical billing, where providers 
accept below market payments for their services and then shift the losses to uninsured). 
74. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 126. 
75. See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort 
Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1478 (1966). 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 629 
ars and courts in certain jurisdictions.76  The common law rule de­
veloped at a point in time when insurance virtually did not exist;77 
the contemporary reality, however, where risk-allocation is a com­
mon practice, has prompted a few changes to the traditional com­
pensatory schemes.  As part of a broader tort reform, many states 
have modified the collateral source rule in certain contexts78 and 
completely abolished it in others.79 
Most relevant statutes do not allow recovery for damages al­
ready paid by a collateral source, but those statutes do not prohibit 
the plaintiff from recovering for damages when a third party payor 
has subrogation rights.80  The idea of this change is to protect the 
subrogation rights of the insurers, which would presumably keep 
insurance premiums low.81  Certain jurisdictions have enacted stat­
utes barring the collateral rule in all personal injury actions for 
damages over a certain amount.  Addressing the issue of overcom­
76. See Fleming supra note 75, at 1478; see also Zorogastua supra note 48; Doug­
las H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1245, 
1260, 1274 (1996) (commenting on Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in 
the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REV. 669, 694-95 (1962) (discussing the 
collateral source rule as being at odds with the compensatory function of tort law)). 
77. Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule: 
Seeking Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 211 
(2009). 
78. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G(a) (2010) (mandating the admis­
sion of evidence of collateral source payments in the context of medical malpractice). 
Similarly, CAL. CIV. CODE  ANN. § 3333.1 (West 1997) and DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 6862 (West 1999) abrogate the collateral source rule in the context of medical 
malpractice. 
79. The collateral source rule had been completely abrogated in: Alabama (ALA. 
CODE § 6-5-545 (2005)), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (2010)), Colorado (COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.6 (West 2004)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52­
225a (2012)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West 2011)), Idaho (IDAHO  CODE 
ANN. § 6-1606 (2010)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 1999)), Iowa (IOWA 
CODE  ANN. § 668.14 (West 1998)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS  ANN. § 600.6303 
(West 2000)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251 (West 2010)), New York (N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 3101(f) (McKinney 2011)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 
(1996)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2011)), and Oregon (OR. REV. 
STAT. § 31.580 (2005) (as cited in Zorogastua, supra note 48, at 500); see also Collateral 
Source Rule Reform, AM. TORT  REFORM  ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/collateral­
source-rule-reform (last visited May 24, 2012) (summary of the states which have abro­
gated or modified the collateral source rule); 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1058-61 (dis­
cussing the rationale and the substance of modifications of the collateral source rule 
among the states); Benjet, supra note 77, at 210. 
80. Benjet, supra note 77, at 211. 
81. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1059.  The idea is that if the collateral source 
rule were repealed the insurer would not be able to ever recuperate what it paid out for 
the plaintiff’s loss, and therefore insurance premiums would rise. This Note, however, 
does not agree with such a proposition because it rests on the inaccurate presumption 
that abolishing the rule necessarily precludes recovery. 
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630 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
pensation, Montana, for example, requires deduction of prior col­
lateral source payments from any compensation for personal injury 
or death, where the total award exceeds $50,000.82  The jury deter­
mines the award without consideration of any collateral source pay­
ments and subsequently, upon separate submission of evidence, the 
trial judge must subtract such payments from the award.83 
Overall, the state laws concerning the collateral source rule re­
main inconsistent.  Some states, including Massachusetts, have re­
pealed the rule in specific contexts, but keep applying it in others.84 
State legislatures have been particularly willing to repeal the rule in 
medical malpractice lawsuits, presumably for policy reasons.85  Cer­
tain courts have found statutes abrogating the collateral source to 
be unconstitutional,86 others have upheld them.87  It appears that 
similar statutes may or may not pass constitutional muster depend­
ing on the state they are adopted in. The Kansas Supreme Court in 
Thompson v. KFB for instance, found a statute allowing evidence 
of collateral source payments in cases where the plaintiff’s damages 
which exceeded $150,000 to be in violation of the rights of equal 
protection and due process, as set forth in the United States and 
Kansas Constitutions.88  According to the Thompson court, the act 
failed to satisfy even the low “rationality basis” test and provided 
no reasonable justification for the created classification of the plain­
tiffs.89  The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, upheld an even 
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (1987). 
83. See Haman v. Maco Ins. Co., 86 P.3d 34, 37 (Mont. 2004) (Nelson, J., dissent­
ing) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308). 
84. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60-G (2010) (providing for medical malpractice 
awards to be offset by collateral sources minus any premiums paid by the claimant to 
secure those benefits); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010) (per­
mitting evidence for collateral source payments in medical malpractice lawsuits).  How­
ever, in both Massachusetts and Delaware the rule is still applicable in the personal 
injury context. See, e.g., Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Mass 2010); Miller v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. 2010). 
85. See supra note 84; see also infra Part IV.A.1. 
86. See, e.g., Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1068 (Kan. 1987) (finding that the 
statute abrogating the collateral source rule discriminated against medical malpractice 
victims); O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (Ky. 1995) (finding that the stat­
ute abrogating the rule was a violation of the separation of powers, since admission of 
evidence is a judicial function) (cited in 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1059 n.22). 
87. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 753 (Ariz. 1977) (the court up­
held an act repealing the collateral source rule, rejecting an equal protection argument) 
(cited in 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1059 n.23). 
88. Thompson v. KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773, 774 (Kan. 1993). 
89. Id.  The court stated that, assuming that lowering the cost of health insurance 
was the objective of the statute and it was a reasonable one, the classification did not 
reasonably further such objective. Id. at 773. 
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broader statute, allowing evidence for collateral source payments in 
all civil actions.90  In Marsh v. Green,91 the court rejected plaintiff’s 
due process and equal protection claims, holding the statute consti­
tutional and thereby reversing a previous case, American Legion 
Post No. 57 v. Leahey.92 
The idea of a collateral source rule reform has been accepted 
ambivalently by different states, and the courts’ polar attitudes to­
wards this reform remain difficult to reconcile.  Recent health care 
law reforms in Massachusetts93 have arguably made the applicabil­
ity of the collateral source rule even more controversial. 
IV. HOW IS  MASSACHUSETTS DIFFERENT? 
A. The Collateral Source Rule in Massachusetts 
1.	 Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule in Medical 
Malpractice 
Concerned with the ever-rising cost of health insurance, Mas­
sachusetts has partially repealed the collateral source rule by adopt­
ing a statute applying to medical malpractice damages.94  Under 
this statute, the judge in a jury trial will deduct the third party pay­
ments less any premiums paid to secure those benefits after the ver­
dict.95  The statute also bars the right of subrogation by collateral 
sources.96  The abrogation of the rule is part of a trend in medical 
malpractice reform aimed at bringing down the medical malpractice 
insurance premiums of doctors, thereby decreasing the cost of their 
90. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-45(a)(1975) (stating that “[i]n all civil actions where 
damages for any medical or hospital expenses are claimed and are legally recoverable 
for personal injury or death, evidence that the plaintiff’s medical or hospital expenses 
have been or will be paid or reimbursed shall be admissible as competent evidence”), 
upheld in Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d. 223, 231 (Ala. 2000) (denying plaintiff’s due 
process and equal protection arguments). 
91. Marsh, 782 So. 2d at 231.  Unlike the Thompson court, the court in Marsh did 
not evaluate the constitutionality of the statute, stating that the plaintiff is challenging 
the policy of the act and policy questions are to be decided by the legislature, and not 
the court. Id. 
92. Am. Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. 1996). The Leahey 
court held that a statute abrogating the collateral source rule violated equal protection 
and due process.  Four years later the court reversed itself in the Marsh opinion. See 
Marsh, 782 So. 2d. at 231. 
93.	 See infra Part IV.B. 
94.	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G(a) (2010). 
95.	 Id. 
96.	 Id. § 60G(c). 
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services and ultimately lowering the cost of health insurance.97  As 
Griffith demonstrated, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court is reluctant to disregard the collateral source rule in the 
context of personal injury.98 
2. Griffith’s Majority and Section 79G 
In Law v. Griffith, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
confronted with the issue of whether to admit the evidence of sub­
stantial insurance write-offs, decided to maintain the status quo and 
disallow such evidence, thereby refusing to abrogate the collateral 
source rule.99  Generally, in order for the plaintiff to receive com­
pensation for medical services, he or she must prove that: “(1) he or 
she has paid or become liable for the medical bills, (2) the defen­
dant’s negligence was the cause of the injuries, and (3) the charges 
were reasonable for the services rendered.”100 
The dispute in Griffith centered around the third requirement. 
Indeed, the parties did not quarrel over the established standard 
that the plaintiff should receive “the value of reasonable medical 
services required to treat the injury.”101  They disagreed, however, 
as to the evidence the jury should use to determine that “reasona­
ble” value.  The defendant argued that the actual medical bills 
charged by the plaintiff’s health care provider should be excluded 
from evidence for two reasons: first, because the victim, as a 
MassHealth recipient, had not paid the bills herself; and second, 
because MassHealth had negotiated and paid a significantly lower 
amount for the medical services the plaintiff received.102  The de­
fendant claimed that since no one paid the full amount of the bills, 
nor was any party responsible for it, this figure was irrelevant in 
establishing the reasonable value of the service.103  A Superior 
Court judge accepted that argument and did not admit the bills into 
evidence.104  Plaintiff appealed from the judgment, claiming that 
97. See Lee Harris, Tort Reform as Carrot-and-Stick, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 163, 
172 (2009). 
98. Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Mass. 2010). 
99. Id. 
100. Natalie J. Kussart, Paid Bills v. Charged Bills: Insurance and the Collateral 
Source Rule, Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847 (2005), 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151, 159 (2006). 
101. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d, at 129 (citing Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000 (Mass. 
2009)). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Law v. Griffith, No. 03-3179, 2006 WL 6482934, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 
24, 2006), rev’d, 930 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010). 
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the bills should have been included in evidence.105  The Appeals 
Court found that the Superior Court judge erred in excluding them 
and determined that a new trial on the damages was required.106 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the 
decision of the Appeals Court on the grounds that Massachusetts 
law requires acceptance of the medical bills as evidence of the “fair 
and reasonable charge” of the service provided.107  In the 
meantime, the court refused to admit evidence of the actual amount 
accepted as payment in full by the provider.108  The reason for that 
was the common law collateral source rule, articulated in section 
920 of the Second Restatement of Torts.109  The court did not find 
anything in the language of the relevant Massachusetts legisla­
tion110 that would suggest the rule was invalid in Massachusetts.111 
In fact, it concluded by negative implication that by abolishing the 
collateral source rule with respect to medical malpractice,112 the 
legislature demonstrated its intent to keep the rule in other 
contexts.113 
Interestingly, the SJC in Griffith acknowledged the inadequacy 
of the medical bills as evidence of the fair and reasonable value of 
the medical service.114  It refused, however, to deny the applicabil­
ity of the collateral source rule to personal injury damages, absent 
relevant legislative action.115  The majority based its decision 
105. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129. 
106. Law v. Griffith, No. 07-P-1972, 2009 WL 652945, at *1(Mass. App. Ct. 2009). 
107. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 130; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010) 
(stating that “[i]n any proceeding commenced in any court . . . an itemized bill . . . shall 
be admissible as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge for such services or the 
necessity of such services or treatments”). 
108. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 131. 
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TORTS § 920A (2) (1979) (stating that 
“[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are 
not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the 
harm for which the tortfeasor is liable”). 
110. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010); see also id. ch. 231, § 60G. 
111. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 134. 
112. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2010) (abrogating the collateral source 
rule in medical malpractice). 
113. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 134. 
114. See id. at 133 (stating that “American . . . medical care providers have devel­
oped charge structures that may have little or no relationship to the reasonable value of 
the medical services at issue”) (emphasis added). 
115. Id. at 134-35 (comparing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 A cmt. d 
(1979), stating that the collateral source rule “can be changed by statute” with Kerins v. 
Lima, 680 N.E.2d 32, 43 (Mass. 1997) (quoting Commercial Wharf E. Condo. Ass’n v. 
Waterfront Parking Corp., 552 N.E.2d 66, 71 (Mass.1990) (claiming that courts will not 
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largely on the statutory framework: the language of section 79G,116 
mandating admission of medical bills in personal injury lawsuits in 
conjunction with the enactment of section 60G abrogating the col­
lateral source rule in medical malpractice lawsuits.117  In sum, the 
court reached the conclusion that: 1) the test for determining com­
pensation is the “fair and reasonable” value of the service;118 2) the 
bills may be inadequate indication for that value;119 but 3) they 
must be admitted, because the statute requires it.120 
To reconcile these somewhat contradictory conclusions, the 
court created its own approach toward determining the “fair and 
reasonable” value of a medical service.  By interpreting the second 
sentence of section 79G,121 the court concluded that it is appropri­
ate to allow a defendant to bring a representative of the medical 
provider to testify on the range of payments accepted by the pro­
vider for the service rendered to the plaintiff.122  That witness, how­
ever, would not be allowed to mention whether the plaintiff has 
health insurance, the payor of the plaintiff’s medical bills, or the 
amount of the actual payments.123 
B. Mandatory Health Insurance in Massachusetts 
The main reason for prohibiting disclosure of the insurance 
benefits conferred upon the plaintiff is the fear that the jury will 
award the plaintiff less if it is aware that she was insured at the time 
of the incident.124  With regard to health insurance, however, there 
is not much room for secrecy in Massachusetts.  In April 2006, Gov­
ernor Mitt Romney signed into law a new bill requiring all residents 
presume the legislature intended “radical change in the common law without a clear 
expression of such intent”)). 
116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010) (stating that “[i]n any proceeding 
commenced in any court . . . an itemized bill . . . shall be admissible as evidence of the 
fair and reasonable charge for such services or the necessity of such services or 
treatments”). 
117. See id. ch. 231, § 60G (providing that compensation should be offset by col­
lateral source payments, minus any premiums paid by the plaintiff to secure those 
benefits). 
118. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 128. 
119. Id. at 133. 
120. Id. at 130-31. 
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010).  “Nothing contained in this section 
shall be construed to limit the right of any party to the action to summon . . . such 
physician, dentist, pharmacist . . . for the purpose of cross examination with respect to 
such bill . . . .” Id. 
122. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135. 
123. Id. 
124. See Eichel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963). 
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of the state to obtain health insurance,125 thereby making Massa­
chusetts the first state in the nation where health insurance is 
mandatory.  The law was part of an “innovative bipartisan plan,”126 
aimed at reducing both the number of uninsured and the cost of 
health insurance.127  The plan provided that the state would estab­
lish a quasi-governmental authority, the Commonwealth Health In­
surance Connector,128 through which Massachusetts residents can 
purchase insurance, at rates based on the individual’s income.129 
Failure to abide by the compulsory purchase mandate would result 
in steep penalties.130 
C. The Collateral Source Rule and the Medically Uninsured 
Being medically uninsured in Massachusetts seems to come at 
a pretty high price, even if a person does not need to see a doctor. 
If an uninsured Massachusetts resident gets injured in a car acci­
dent, however, he will have to face more than a fine for being unin­
sured.  He will actually have to pay his full medical bill.131  So, if 
Ms. Law were not a MassHealth recipient, but instead had no insur­
ance, she would have had to come up with $112,269.94132 on her 
own.  In those circumstances, there would be no discussion about 
evidence for insurance write-offs, because no such evidence would 
125. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(a) (2010); see also David A. 
Fahrenthold, Mass. Bill Requires Health Coverage, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/04/AR20060404019 
37.html. 
126. William C. Symonds, In Massachusetts, Health Care for All?, BUS. WK., Apr. 
l4, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/apr2006/pi20060404 
_152510.htm. 
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(a) (2010) (indicating that with very narrow 
exceptions, heath insurance is required for Massachusetts residents). 
128. HEALTH  CONNECTOR: HEALTH  INSURANCE FOR  MASSACHUSETTS  RE­
SIDENTS, https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector/ (last visited May 24, 
2012May 24, 2012). 
129. Id. 
130. See Massachusetts Health Insurance Requirements, MASSRESOURCES.ORG, 
http://www.massresources.org/infopages.cfm?ABPageID=93&MainParentID=93#how 
muchpenalty (providing penalty rates for the uninsured) (last visited May 24, 2012). 
For example, for 2011, a 27 year old with an annual income of $32,676 (300% of Federal 
Poverty Guidelines) would have to pay a tax penalty of $1,212 per year for being 
uninsured. 
131. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Mass. 2010); see also George A. 
Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing 
of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 119 (2005) (discussing the discrepancy in rates for 
uninsured and insured patients). 
132. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129 (spelling out the full amount of the plaintiff’s 
medical bills). 
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exist.  Following Griffith’s rationale and section 79G, the court 
would admit the doctor’s bill and a range of payments accepted for 
the service.133  One could only guess what price tag the jury would 
have put on the medical services provided, faced with a “range” of 
payments for that same service between $16,387.14134 and 
$112,269.94.135  The Griffith court, however, did not comment on 
whether a court should allow evidence for the full payment of the 
medical bills in cases where the patient is uninsured.136 
The majority in Griffith approached the collateral source rule 
issue cautiously, apparently unwilling to set it aside, but in the 
meantime not expressing a strong opinion in its favor. The concur­
rence, on the other hand, had quite a different approach towards 
the problem. 
D. Justice Cowin’s Concurring Opinion in Griffith 
The concurrence in Griffith137 was more willing to comment on 
and even criticize the collateral source rule. Justice Cowin, joined 
by Chief Justice Ireland and Justice Spina, accepted the majority’s 
analysis of the first sentence of section 79G, agreeing that the stat­
ute138 unambiguously mandates the admissibility of itemized medi­
cal bills as evidence for the fair and reasonable charge of a medical 
service.139  However, Justice Cowin criticized the majority’s inter­
pretation of the second sentence of the same statute,140 which the 
majority qualified as “general” and not “delineating in any manner 
the permissible scope of the witnesses’ testimony or the use of the 
records.”141  The majority concluded that the Massachusetts legisla­
ture intended to retain the collateral source rule in tort recovery 
cases.142  Justice Cowin, however, found no language in the statute 
to suggest such intent.143  According to the concurring justices, the 
majority adopted an inconsistent approach with respect to the ap­
plicability of the collateral source rule: on one hand, the court rec­
ognized the problem of the evidentiary deficiency of the rule; on 
133. Id. at 128. 
134. Id. at 131. 
135. Id. 
136. See id. at 135 n.16. 
137. Id. at 136 (Cowin, J., concurring). 
138. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010). 
139. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135-36; id. at 136 (Cowin, J., concurring). . 
140. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
141. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135. 
142. Id. at 134. 
143. Id. at 136 (Cowin, J., concurring). 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 637 
the other, it refused to repeal the rule.144  This approach, Justice 
Cowin opined, conflicted with 79G, “which appear[ed] to accom­
modate no restrictions on the use of other admissible evidence.”145 
The concurring justices found unpersuasive the majority’s pub­
lic policy argument that admitting evidence for health insurance 
write-offs creates a risk for potential unequal treatment of pa­
tients—recipients of MassHealth.146  If the court allowed defend­
ants to present to the jury evidence of MassHealth’s deeply 
discounted rates, the majority argued, the jury would award no 
more than the write-off amount, thereby creating a class of people, 
whose treatment is “worth” less than the treatment of plaintiffs car­
rying private insurance or no insurance at all.147  Justice Cowin did 
not attempt to rebut or affirm the accuracy of that presumption, but 
believed it had nothing to do with determining the legislature’s in­
tent when adopting section 79G.148  According to Justice Cowin, the 
legislature’s intent to allow evidence of collateral payments was just 
as unambiguous as its intent to allow the actual medical bills before 
the jury.149  In fact, by treating both kinds of evidence (of actual 
payments and medical bills) differently, the majority had miscon­
strued section79G.150  The statute’s purpose, in Justice Cowin’s 
view, was to provide a simple exception to the hearsay rule and not 
to create confusion.151 
Furthermore, Justice Cowin discussed the history of the stat­
ute, enacted at a time when the funding of medical services was 
organized differently, and when third party payments were the ex­
ception, not the rule.152  And since health insurance write-offs were 
not common practice, the actual medical bills used to reflect rela­
144. See id. at 137 (stating that “[t]he court’s decision demonstrates that it recog­
nizes the problem, but also that it shrinks from the most workable solution”). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 136. 
147. Id. at 134 n.11 (majority opinion).  The court’s presumption appears to be 
that if MassHealth patients’ treatment is “cheaper” than the treatment of “richer” 
plaintiffs, then the jury would undervalue all MassHealth-insured plaintiffs’ economic 
losses. 
148. Id. at 138 (Cowin, J., concurring) (stating also that “jurors are as likely to be 
resentful of the rich as they are to be prejudiced against the poor”) Id. 
149. Id. at 136. 
150. Id. at 136-38. 
151. “[T]he Legislature intended when it adopted in § 79G what appears to be an 
uncomplicated exception to the hearsay rule.” Id at 138.  Under the hearsay rule 
neither medical bills, nor actual insurance payments would be admitted into evidence. 
See FED. R. EVID. 801. 
152. Id. at 136. 
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638 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
tively accurately the reasonable value of the service.153  Justice 
Cowin noted that at the present time, when health care is funded 
largely by collateral sources such as private and public health insur­
ance, this model has changed.154  The medical bills now “often re­
flect costs, such as overhead, capital investment, research and 
development, and the subsidizing of . . . medical procedures, that 
are unrelated to the value of the specific services performed.”155 
Those factors, bearing no relevance to the actual treatment of the 
patient, have led to the inflation of charges for medical treatment, 
while at the same time providers are willing to accept significantly 
lower payments for the same services by insurance companies.156 
Therefore, according to Justice Cowin, the medical bills are no 
longer a reliable indicator of the reasonable value of medical 
services.157 
In order to avoid prejudice, the Griffith majority decided to 
exclude evidence of Ms. Law’s payments altogether.158  However, 
according to Justice Cowin, the problem with potential jury 
prejudice could be easily solved by adequate jury instructions,159 
without completely excluding evidence of such payments. In Justice 
Cowin’s opinion, keeping a plaintiff’s health insurance obscured 
from a juror, who is presumably himself insured, does nothing to 
promote just compensation.160  This sort of secrecy ultimately com­
pels the jury to guess which one of the “range” of numbers before it 
is the correct one, instead of outright telling the jury how much was 
paid.161  The new realities in health care compensation, according to 
Justice Cowin, have made the collateral source rule “an anachro­
nism” when applied to determining the value of medical services.162 
The following section further discusses its deficiencies, particularly 
in a state with mandatory health insurance. 
153. Id. at 137. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 138. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 131 (majority opinion). 
159. See id. at 138 (Cowin, J., concurring) (stating that “jurors overwhelmingly 
fulfil [sic] their obligations with great seriousness, follow[ing] instructions”). 
160. Id. at 139. 
161. Id. at 138-39.  “[J]urors will remain mystified by the refusal to tell them what 
a given procedure actually cost.  In sum, we move farther and farther from the objective 
of valuing the medical services provided to the injured plaintiff.” Id. at 139 (Cowin J., 
concurring). 
162. Id. at 137. 
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V. WHY THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IS INADEQUATE TO
 
SERVE ITS INTENDED PURPOSE IN MASSACHUSETTS
 
Most arguments in favor of the collateral source rule appear to 
be based on two general assumptions: that introducing evidence of 
third party payments will have a prejudicial effect on the jury, and 
that a windfall for one of the parties is unavoidable.163  Those as­
sumptions, however, are misguided, especially in the Common­
wealth of Massachusetts.164  Moreover, the rule seems to deepen 
the problem it purports to cure: instead of avoiding the under-com­
pensation of low-income plaintiffs, it can potentially cause the op­
posite effect.165 
A. Does “Blindfolding”166 the Jury Really Avoid Confusion? 
1. The Prejudicial Effect of Insurance 
One of the most common justifications for the inadmissibility 
of collateral source payments is that such evidence would lead the 
jury to reduce or deny adequate compensation.167  Generally, this 
seems to be a legitimate concern, especially in times of economic 
recession, when juries are possibly becoming more conservative 
when assessing damages.168  Since jurors have to award recovery for 
“the value of reasonable medical services required to treat the 
[plaintiff’s] injury,”169 and the health insurance “write-offs” are not 
an adequate measure of such value,170 it is logical to presume that 
seeing those bills would confuse the jury. 
163. See supra Part I.A. 
164. See supra Part IV.A-C. 
165. See supra Part IV.A-B. 
166. See EDIE  GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION, DETERMINING  DAMAGES: THE  PHYSIOLOGY OF  JURY  AWARDS, 167 
(2002) (describing the “[e]ffects of ‘blindfolding’” jurors, i.e., depriving them from 
material information, in order to avoid bias). 
167. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) (quoting Goldstein v. 
Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974)).  In Goldstein, the court stated that “jurors 
might be led by the irrelevancy” of the third party payment and deny recovery for the 
plaintiff. Goldstein, 309 N.E.2d at 203; see also Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 
802 (Mass. 1985). 
168. See generally Edie Green, The Art and Science of Litigation Advocacy: Jury 
Damage Awards in Times of Recession, THE JURY EXPERT (July 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/07/jury-damage-awards-in-times-of-recession/. (dis­
cussing the possible effects of the recession on jury awards, and stating that “jurors who 
have recently lost jobs may be especially hard on plaintiffs”). 
169. See Rodgers v. Boynton 52 N.E.2d 576, 576 (Mass. 1943). 
170. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 130 (discussing the standard for recovery of medi­
cal expenses in negligence cases); see also id. at133 (stating that at the present time, 
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640 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
In Massachusetts, however, trying to keep evidence of such 
payments away from the jury likely causes more confusion than it 
prevents.  It is axiomatic that society functions on the presumption 
that its members obey the law.171  Since in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts health insurance is required by statute,172 the jurors 
would be justified to suppose that the plaintiff is insured and that 
his insurance paid for the better portion of his medical bills.173 
Therefore, even if, as proponents of the collateral source rule sug­
gest, this information is irrelevant in determining the fair value of 
the service,174 now it has become implausible to hide it. 
It is a well established rule that the presence of insurance often 
has prejudicial effect and is inadmissible,175 since it may cause infla­
tion of the award (if the tortfeasor has liability insurance) or defla­
tion (if the victim has insurance against the risk in question).  In 
that sense, however, the juries in Massachusetts already are bi­
ased;176 they know it is more likely than not that someone paid for 
medical bills admissible under the first sentence of § 79G may bear little relationship to 
the “fair and reasonable” value of medical services rendered). 
171. The Ancient Roman law presumption of innocence, Ei incumbit probatio qui 
dicit, non qui negat (the burden of proof rests on who asserts, not on who denies, i.e. a 
person is innocent, until proven guilty) is embedded in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V-VI; Fran¸ enas,cois Quintard-Mor´
The Presumption of Innocence in the French and Anglo-American Legal Tradition, 58 
AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 111 & 111 n.25 (2010). 
172. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 111M, § 2(a) (2010) (indicating that, with very narrow 
exceptions, all residents of Massachusetts are required to obtain health insurance). 
173. The term “better portion of [the] bill[ ]” is used here in the sense of the 
major portion of the sum, owed by the patient, which does not necessarily mean the 
whole actual bill, since medical providers often accept a fraction of it as payment in full. 
174. See, e.g., Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132; Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 
203 (Mass. 1974). 
175. FED. R. EVID. 411 (stating that evidence that a person charged with negli­
gence does or does not have liability insurance is inadmissible). See, e.g., Mangan v. 
Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24, 25 (7th Cir. 1965) (finding that the defense 
counsel’s mentioning of the fact that the plaintiff carried workman’s compensation was 
prejudicial). See generally STEIN, supra note 2, § 13:14 (discussing the limited admissi­
bility of evidence of collateral sources).  Introducing evidence that one of the parties is 
insured, however, is not always inadmissible.  The courts apply a balancing test to deter­
mine admissibility of insurance payments. Compare Wright v. Hiester Const. Co., Inc., 
698 S.E.2d 822, 822-23 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that the probative value of liability 
insurance outweighed the potential prejudicial effect and the risk of jury confusion), 
with Walker v. Big Burger Rests., Inc., No. 09-532, 2010 WL 427736, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
2010) (stating that “any probative value of evidence regarding the assignment of the 
lien or workers’ compensation benefits would be outweighed by the prejudicial effect 
such evidence could have”). 
176. Even in Massachusetts evidence of collateral source payments is admissible 
when the jury is misled by the plaintiff. See supra note 43.  By the same logic, it should 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 641 
the plaintiff’s medical bills, and it is unrealistic to imagine that they 
will ignore that fact. 
2.	 Health Insurance “Write-offs” and the “Anchor” Theory 
of Damage Determination 
At the present time, health insurance write-offs are more of a 
rule than an exception, and the uninsured are practically the only 
ones who pay full price for medical services.177  Even if the jury 
does not know that insurance companies pay discount rates, adopt­
ing Griffith’s approach will cure that lack of awareness. The Grif­
fith court held that not only may the actual bill be offered into 
evidence, but a range of payments accepted by the provider for the 
same service may also be offered.178  The very fact that there is a 
range is enough to put the jury on notice that some patients are 
liable for significantly smaller amounts for the same service than 
others.  Logically, in cases like Griffith, where that range is particu­
larly wide, the jury’s task to determine what is the reasonable value 
of the service is exceptionally difficult. 
Cognitive psychologists suggest that when quantifying a plain­
tiff’s loss, juries rely on “salient numerical reference points,” figura­
tively named “anchors.”179  Such “anchors” may be the relief 
amount stated by plaintiffs in the ad damnum clause180 of their 
complaints, or the cap on damages in the given jurisdiction.181 
Studies show that generally “the more you ask for, the more you 
get.”182  At the same time, however, the awards may be reduced by 
the presence of a “counteranchor”—an amount, proposed by the 
defense, especially if that number is offered by an expert.183  In 
be admissible if the jury is “misled” by the presumption that everyone in the state is 
actually insured. 
177. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 133; see also HALL & SCHNEIDER, supra note 72, 
at 645 (contending that “managed care relegates uninsured patients to a new market­
place . . . of uncommon harshness dominated by doctors, hospitals, and insurers” and 
explaining that “insurers aggressively negotiate rates for plan members; uninsured pa­
tients must ‘bargain’ individually with providers who are determined to recoup what 
they bargained away to insurers”). 
178. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
179. See  GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 135. 
180. A clause in a complaint, stating the relief sought. BLACK’S  LAW  DICTION­
ARY 43 (9th ed. 2009). 
181. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 150-59. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 153-55.  The expert function is important in Griffith, since the jury 
would presumably be presented with information about the range of payments by a 
representative of the provider, an expert witness. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G 
(2010). 
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642 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
sum, often there are two conflicting reference points—one sug­
gested by the defendant, and another by the plaintiff—between 
which the jury has to choose. 
Applying the “anchor” theory to Griffith, however, would 
mean that the jury would have to base its determination of the 
value of the medical service rendered to the plaintiff not on two, 
but on multiple possible reference points, ranging between 
$16,387.14 and $112,269.94.184  Despite the purpose for which this 
array of numbers would be offered—to aid the jury—they would, in 
effect, cancel each other’s “anchoring” function completely.  It is 
obviously impossible that each number can be an indicator for the 
objectively “reasonable” value of the same service. 
According to the holistic approach of assessing damages, the 
jury will award what intuitively “seems right.”185  Under this ap­
proach, without any further guidance, the jury would have no 
choice but to make an estimate based on its own preconceived no­
tions of appropriateness186 and not on the records presented.187  In 
that respect, showing the jury a range of payments accepted for the 
same service would be close to meaningless, since none of those 
numbers is a solid reference point upon which it could base its 
decision. 
A Massachusetts jury, however, imagining that the plaintiff is 
insured, would be justified to assume that one of those numbers is 
in fact “right,” because it reflects the actual payment of the bill.  In 
that respect, keeping evidence of insurance payments away from 
the jurors puts them in an awkward “guessing” position: they know 
someone covered the bill, and that the amount paid is likely intro­
duced to them as part of the “range” of payments, but they do not 
184. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Mass. 2010) (admitting evidence 
for the “range” of payments between the actual payment of the bill and the full amount 
of the bill). 
185. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166 (quoting a study of juries in tort 
and contract cases showing that about a third of the jurors pick a number that seems 
reasonable, without explicit calculation).  The holistic and cognitive approaches are not 
mutually exclusive but complement one another.  Interestingly, even Griffith’s majority 
recognizes the fact that the full bill is not a good indication of reasonableness. See 
Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 133 (stating that “American . . . medical care providers have 
developed charge structures that may have little or no relationship to the reasonable 
value of the medical services at issue”) (emphasis added). Therefore, even the bill is 
not a reliable “anchor” for determining the reasonable value of the service. 
186. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 158-61. 
187. See id. at 169 (stating that “in the absence of explicit instructions, juror’s 
assessment[s] of damages are likely to be inconsistent, haphazard and, on occasion, con­
trary to the . . . law”). 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 643 
know which one is the number.188  The collateral source rule, in its 
attempt to steer the jury’s attention away from the fact the plaintiff 
may be insured (thereby preventing under-compensation), merely 
obscures the sum paid.  In a state where health insurance is optional 
it is probably possible to make the jury “forget” about it. Where 
health insurance payment is presumed, however, it is pointless to 
try to keep it a secret. 
B.	 Punished Once, Punished Twice: The Collateral Source Rule 
and Uninsured Plaintiffs 
1.	 “Compensatory” Damages Are Meant to Compensate 
the Victim.  Or Are They? 
Assessing the “reasonable” value of a medical service is not the 
only difficulty confronting a jury in a tort action. The jury also has 
to make sure that the victim is placed back in the position he or she 
was in before the accident.189  In monetary terms, that means that 
the victim should be reimbursed for at least his or her out of pocket 
expenses.  While in Griffith the plaintiff, whose health insurer nego­
tiated exceptionally low payments, will be most likely overcompen­
sated,190 under-compensation of other victims in similar 
circumstances is just as likely. 
188. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at139 (Cowin, J., concurring) (maintaining that hid­
ing from the jury the fact that the plaintiff may be insured while being expected to be 
insured is counterintuitive). 
If, in fact, we ever needed to shield jurors from the reality of insurance or 
other mechanisms by which another pays a party’s tort damages, we need not 
do so now.  Jurors know insurance exists; they have it themselves. Yet we 
cling to a curious practice whereby we attempt to deny to a juror, who may 
himself or herself that day have submitted a claim to a health carrier, the fact 
that a party in the case before him also has insurance coverage. The court 
today recognizes this reality but coyly deprives that juror of a complete picture 
of how that insurance has operated in the case on trial. 
Id. (Cowin, J., concurring). 
189. See Cortez v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 617 F.3d 688, 693, n.30 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Unlike punitive damages that are intended to punish and deter, ‘compensatory dam­
ages are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of 
the defendant’s wrongful conduct.’”) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Camp­
bell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)); Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307, 
1318 (10th Cir. 1973) (“Appellant is entitled to be compensated for losses attributable 
to the injury inflicted, but it is not entitled to earn a profit.”) (emphasis added); 25 C.J.S. 
Damages § 21 (2010) (“Compensatory damages are damages sufficient in amount to 
indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered and thereby make him or her whole. 
The purpose of awarding compensatory damages is not to enable the injured party to 
make a profit on the transaction.”) (emphasis added) (foonote omitted). 
190. Ms. Law’s insurance paid a very low amount, compared to the full bill. The 
payment by MassHealth was likely on the lower end of the spectrum (since it was signif­
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644 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
While the 2006 health care reform in Massachusetts decreased 
the percent of uninsured residents, a large number of people in the 
Commonwealth still do not carry health insurance.191  If any of 
those residents becomes injured in a tort and seeks medical atten­
tion, he will have to pay full price for the service. For example, let 
us imagine that the Griffith plaintiff, Ms. Law, was in fact unin­
sured.  Then the only way to fully compensate her for her medical 
expenses would be to award her the entire amount of her bill.  If 
Griffith’s rationale applies to the uninsured plaintiffs, the court 
would admit no evidence of paid or unpaid amounts.  All the jury 
would see would be a range of payments between $16,387.14 (or 
possibly less, since it is unclear if indeed MassHealth negotiated the 
lowest possible rate for that particular service) and $112,269.90.192 
While it is impossible to foresee how much the jury would award, it 
would likely be a number in between both ends of the spectrum, 
and not necessarily the full amount of the bill.  In that sense, the 
plaintiff would receive less than she owed her medical provider and 
would have to pay the difference out-of-pocket. 
The Griffith majority, however, explicitly refused to express an 
opinion on the question of whether an uninsured patient would be 
allowed to admit evidence of his actual payments.193  That approach 
unambiguously indicates that the uninsured are regarded as a dif­
ferent “class” of tort victims to whom the rule may or may not ap­
ply.  Trying to treat the uninsured differently than the insured raises 
an equal protection issue, which is beyond the scope of this Note. 
In reality, whether such evidence is admitted or not, the uninsured 
plaintiff remains in a precarious position. 
If evidence of actual payment by the victim is not admitted and 
all the jury sees is the bill and a range of payments accepted for the 
service, the plaintiff will most likely be under-compensated. The 
only way for the jury to fully compensate the victim will be to 
award nothing short of the full bill.  In order to do that, the jury will 
have to assume that the victim has no insurance, and no “write­
icantly lower than the bill submitted) and therefore Ms. Law can only be over and not 
under-compensated.  In fact, she already was awarded more than what MassHealth paid 
for her treatment. See supra note 61. 
191. The most recent national data shows that in 2008 there were 264,000 unin­
sured Massachusetts residents. See A Preliminary Evaluation of Health Insurance Cov­
erage in the 2008 American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (Sept. 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/acs/2008/2008ACS_healthins. 
pdf. 
192. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135. 
193. See id. at 136 n.16. 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 645 
offs” are in place.  Presuming that, however, would be counterintui­
tive for a Massachusetts jury, since health insurance is mandatory in 
the Commonwealth.194  Therefore, it is more likely than not that 
the jury, unaware of how much was actually paid for the service and 
assuming the victim is insured, would award an amount smaller 
than the entire bill,195 thereby under-compensating the plaintiff for 
her injury. 
If evidence of actual payment by the victim were admitted, it 
would solve the problem of under-compensation.  However, it is 
quite unrealistic that the uninsured plaintiff will have paid her med­
ical bills in full in advance of her personal injury trial.196  Even 
though there are probably some exceptions, it is hard to imagine 
that a person who cannot afford health insurance197 could come up 
with a large sum out-of-pocket, pay his own bills, and then try to 
recoup the payment in court.  Absent evidence of actual payment, 
the plaintiff cannot show that he is responsible for the entire bill, 
because he is not allowed to state that he has no insurance (and the 
jury will most likely presume he is insured).  Therefore, whether 
evidence of actual payments is admitted or not, the uninsured vic­
tim would be “punished”: either for being uninsured or for not pay­
ing his bill, because in each of these scenarios the plaintiff will not 
be able to present evidence of his actual payment.198 
194. This hypothetical is applicable only in cases where the injured party is in fact 
a Massachusetts resident and the jury is aware of that fact or where the plaintiff is 
resident of a different state, but the jury is unaware of it, and assumes the plaintiff 
resides in the Commonwealth.  Because this Note is intended to discuss the effect of the 
collateral source rule on Massachusetts residents only, the rule’s implication on out-of­
state plaintiffs is outside the scope of this work. 
195. See, e.g., GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 168-69 (discussing the 
effects of hiding information from the jury regarding the economic consequences of 
their awards and stating that “a blindfold may permit (rather than prevent) juries to 
reach verdicts based on misinformation”).  The authors give an example of a situation 
where jurors presume that the defendant has insurance, covering the total loss and ex­
plain that in such circumstances the jury may “inflate [plaintiff’s] award,” resulting in 
the defendant, with no insurance, having to pay an artificially inflated award. Id. 
196. Evidence of the unpaid bill would not help the plaintiff unless it is made 
explicit that he has no insurance that would pay for it. 
197. Even though insufficient financial means is not the only reason for being 
uninsured, statistics suggest it is the leading reason. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra 
note 191 (pointing out that the uninsured are generally lower income residents). 
198. Perhaps an exception of the collateral source rule that would make it inap­
plicable in cases where the plaintiff is uninsured would solve the issue of possible 
under-compensation.  Such an exception, however, seems against public policy, because 
it would benefit plaintiffs, who have violated the law by not obtaining obligatory health 
insurance, while law-abiding victims whose insurance has unfavorable terms (such as 
high deductibles and insignificant write-offs) would still be disadvantaged. 
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2.	 The Uninsured in Massachusetts Are Already a
 
Marginalized Class
 
One of the arguments in favor of the collateral source rule, 
articulated by the Griffith majority, is that admitting evidence of 
insurance payments would create a perception of the public health 
benefit recipients as being a “lower” class of people, whose insur­
ance pays less than full price for their treatment.199  The effect of 
that social stratification of plaintiffs would arguably result in a low­
ering of the awards for economically disadvantaged victims. The 
majority’s argument did not rise to a constitutional concern but was 
framed in terms of social policy.  If, however, the court is worried 
about disadvantaging low income individuals (which undisputedly 
MassHealth recipients are),200 it should be just as concerned about 
plaintiffs who do not qualify for MassHealth and still cannot afford 
insurance. 
An uninsured plaintiff is not necessarily a sympathetic one, be­
cause in addition to violating a state law, he or she is hindering the 
goals of the Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act and, presuma­
bly, is burdening society at large.201  Considering the fact that being 
uninsured is a violation punishable by law,202 however, it becomes 
important to determine the probable reasons why certain Massa­
chusetts residents violate it.  When residents are actually paying for 
199. Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 134 n.11 (Mass. 2010); see also Brief for 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys as Amicus Curiae, Law v. Griffith, 930 
N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010), 2008 WL 7182151, at *13 (arguing that allowing evidence for 
actual payments leads to “discriminatory legal treatment of the under privileged”). 
200. In order to qualify for MassHealth a resident needs to meet the income re­
quirement of having income less than 100% to 150% poverty level, except in special 
circumstances. See What Are the Income Limits?, MASS RESOURCES.ORG, http://www. 
massresources.org/pages.cfm?contentID=35&pageID=13&subpages=yes&SecondLevel 
dynamicID=565&DynamicID=559#income (last visited May 24, 2012). 
201. The idea of mandatory coverage is that it will bring the cost of health insur­
ance down by providing a large pool of people contributing smaller payments and by 
reducing emergency room losses.  By virtue of the 1986 Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), an emergency room (ER) cannot deny treatment to 
an uninsured patient.  That is why, allegedly, many uninsured patients use the ER as 
their only health care option and then do not pay their bills, causing losses, which are 
subsequently passed on to the other patients by inflating the price of the ER services. 
Presumably, if everyone has insurance, residents will more often seek preventive care, 
which is cheaper than emergency care, and will have their bills paid by their insurance, 
avoiding losses to the provider and therefore avoiding price inflation.  In this respect, 
being uninsured theoretically contributes to high costs of medical services to everyone. 
See generally Craig Richardson, Mandatory Health Insurance: Lessons from Massachu­
setts, 29 CATO J. 335 (2009), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n2/cj29 
n2-7.pdf. 
202. See supra Part IV.C. 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 647 
being uninsured, neglect and lack of foresight are hardly the default 
reasons anymore.  While there are many possible reasons why a 
person would choose not to purchase health insurance, pricing ap­
pears to be one of the major reasons. 
According to a study conducted by The State Health Access 
Data Assistance Center the bulk of the uninsured in Massachusetts 
are lower income individuals.203  The survey points out that the un­
insured in Massachusetts are primarily single young males, mem­
bers of racial or ethnic minorities, non-citizens, or people who are 
not proficient in the English language.204  Other than the “single 
young male” category, the rest are economically disadvantaged and 
already marginalized.  Therefore, if the Massachusetts Supreme Ju­
dicial Court is concerned with protecting the poor, it has a good 
reason to worry not only about the poor insured victims (who, as 
Griffith shows, have a legitimate chance of getting a windfall)205 but 
also the uninsured poor as well (who likely will be under-
compensated). 
In addition to being economically disadvantaged, the unin­
sured in Massachusetts are already penalized for their non-compli­
ance with the law by having their tax return reduced.206  Of course, 
the fines they have to pay for being uninsured do not confer any 
health care benefits and they would still have to pay out-of-pocket 
for any expenses incurred, presumably at full price, even when they 
are injured by someone else. 
The public and individual benefits of mandatory health insur­
ance are not disputed in this Note.207  In this respect, the penalties 
203. See Sharon K. Long, Lokendra Phadera & Victoria Lynch, Massachusetts 
Health Reform in 2008: Who Are the Remaining Uninsured Adults?, SHADAC.ORG 2 
(Aug. 2010), http://www.shadac.org/files/shadac/publications/MassReform2008Unin­
suredBrief.pdf. 
204. Id. at 3. 
205. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132. 
206. See Special Topics of Interest to Massachusetts Residents, MASS­
RESOURCES.ORG, available at http://www.massresources.org/infopages.cfm?ABPageID= 
93&MainParentID=93#howmuchpenalty (last visited May 24, 2012) (providing penalty 
rates for the uninsured).  While those penalties do not affect persons whose income is 
too low to require filing a tax return, it certainly has an effect on people whose income, 
albeit being above the Federal Poverty Guidelines, is still far from being high. In practi­
cal terms, if, for example, in 2010, a married Massachusetts couple earning between 
$29,148.00 and $36,432.00 (200%-250% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines) did not 
carry adequate health insurance, the couple will have to pay $912.00 ($456.00 each) 
penalty out of their 2010 tax return. See id.  If that couple has gross income of 
$43,716.00 in 2010 and both partners are older than 27, they will have to pay $ 2,232.00 
($1,116.00) per person. See id. 
207. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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648 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
for violation of the requirement are not challenged.  It is the con­
tention of this Note, however, that those Massachusetts residents 
who are uninsured or inadequately insured already pay the price for 
their violations and there is no justification for further penalizing 
them.  Since applying the collateral source rule to plaintiff’s medical 
expenses may lead to under-compensation of uninsured victims, it 
amounts to duplicate punishment.  Certainly, uninsured individuals 
made the choice to break the law and bear the risk of injury on 
their own.  However, if their injuries are caused by the negligent 
conduct of another, the risk of loss should be shifted to the wrong­
doer and not remain with the victim. 
C.	 Overcompensation and Deterrence: Is a Windfall Really 
Inevitable? 
1.	 Defendants Do Not Directly Profit from Plaintiff’s 
Insurance “Write-Offs” 
The collateral source rule is based on the presumption that a 
windfall for one of the parties is practically inevitable: either the 
victim will get more than enough to make him “whole” or the 
tortfeasor will benefit from the victim’s contract with his insurer.208 
Therefore, since the defendant is the person whose behavior society 
is trying to correct, it is considered fair that she pay the full value of 
her wrong, even if that amounts to overcompensating the 
plaintiff.209 
208.	 See supra Part I.A.1. 
209. The Griffith majority implicitly agrees with the proposition that one of the 
parties to the dispute will inevitably get a windfall: either the plaintiff will receive more 
that his insurance paid for his service, or the defendant will pay less than the full 
amount the medical provider charged.  The latter effect will occur if the defendant only 
pays the reduced price of the service.  However, this reduction is a result of the plain­
tiff’s insurance company negotiating lower rates with the provider and it will arguably 
be unfair to allow the defendant, the adverse party, to benefit from it. Therefore, Grif­
fith suggests, it will be more just for the plaintiff, the intended beneficiary of the health 
insurance, to receive the windfall, and not the defendant. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 
132. 
[R]educing recovery by the amount of the benefits received by the plaintiff 
would grant a windfall to the defendant by allowing a credit for the reasonable 
value of those benefits.  Such credit would result in the benefits being effec­
tively directed to the tortfeasor and from the intended party-the injured plain­
tiff.  If there is a windfall, it is considered more just that the injured person 
profit rather than grant the wrongdoer relief from full responsibility for the 
wrongdoing. 
Id. 
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This line of reasoning, however, is somewhat misguided, since 
in most cases the defendant receives no direct “benefit” from the 
presumably lower amount of compensation paid for the plaintiff’s 
medical expenses.  As much as the proponents of the collateral 
source rule want to shy away from that fact, in reality, in personal 
injury cases the defendant’s liability insurance210 is the one paying 
for the plaintiff’s injuries.  If, for example, Mr. Griffith had no lia­
bility insurance,211 he would have had to pay Ms. Law’s health care 
expenses out of pocket.  Only in those circumstances would it be 
fair to say that Mr. Griffith would personally get a windfall if he 
only had to pay the amount negotiated by the plaintiff’s health in­
surance (assuming the negotiated rate was not the “fair and reason­
able” value of the service).  If, however, what the plaintiff’s health 
insurance paid was in fact the fair value of the service, or if Mr. 
Griffith was insured, the “inevitable windfall” theory falls apart. 
If Mr. Griffith had liability insurance (which is the more plausi­
ble scenario, since he was required to have it by law)212 and the 
insurance, rather than Mr. Griffith personally, paid for Ms. Law’s 
medical expenses, it would make no immediate difference to Mr. 
Griffith whether the insurance company paid $16,000.00 or 
$120,000.00.  While his insurance premiums would presumably go 
up, that increase would hardly be influenced by the amount 
awarded to the plaintiff, because he would be penalized with the 
same amount of surcharge points.213  In effect, the defendant’s in­
210. Liability insurance is required for a motor vehicle registration. See Applying 
for a Registration, MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, REGISTRY OF 
MOTOR  VEHICLES, available at http://www.mass.gov/rmv/regs/index.htm (last visited 
May 24, 2012). 
211. It is not clear from the case, whether he had insurance or not.  In fact, dis­
cussing the defendant’s insurance status would have been considered prejudicial in and 
of itself. See FED. R. EVID. 411; Mangan v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24 
(7th Cir. 1965) (finding that defense counsel’s mentioning of the fact that the plaintiff 
carried workman’s compensation was prejudicial). See generally  STEIN supra note 2, 
§ 13:14 (discussing the limited admissibility of evidence of collateral sources). 
212. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 1A (2008); see also RAYMOND J. KENNEY, 
JR. & TERESA´  J. FARRIS, 12 MASS. PRACTICE, MOTOR  VEHICLE  LAW & PRACTICE 
§ 25:26 (4th ed. 2008) (stating that ”[s]ince the 1920’s it has been mandatory that all 
operators traveling on public ways and roads within the Commonwealth and all vehicles 
registered in Massachusetts, be covered by a compulsory motor vehicle insurance 
policy”). 
213. See Merit Rating Board, MASS. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.massdot.state. 
ma.us/rmv/MeritRatingBoard.aspx (last visited May 24, 2012).  According to the point 
surcharge system, Mr. Griffith would have received four surcharge points (since the 
claim against him is for over $2000) whether he paid MassHealth’s write-off price or the 
full amount of the bill.  Points are counted and not weighed, i.e. the surcharge is based 
on the number of points and not directly on the severity of the damage caused. Id. 
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650 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:619 
surance premiums would increase at the same rate, regardless of 
whether his liability insurer paid the full medical bill or the dis­
counted amount; therefore, the defendant would get no 
“windfall.”214 
In addition to avoiding a “windfall” to the defendant, the idea 
behind requiring him to pay an amount, likely higher than the ac­
tual sum paid, is that this is the only way to effectively deter the 
defendant from wrongdoing.215  This “you break it, you buy it” phi­
losophy, however, does not always serve its intended purpose when 
the tortfeasor is insured.216  If the amount paid does not directly 
affect the insurance premiums of the tortfeasor, inflating the com­
pensatory payment to the plaintiff beyond the limits of actual com­
pensation would hardly deter the defendant more effectively.217 
2.	 Fair Compensation Does Not Require a “Windfall” to 
the Victim218 
The problems of overcompensating tort victims and juries that 
are overly sympathetic towards the victim have been widely dis­
cussed.219  This Note, however, is not concerned per se with the is­
214. Indeed, the only party that could possibly get a “windfall” in this situation is 
the insurance company, which would have to pay less if the plaintiff’s health insurer had 
negotiated lower prices for the health care provider’s services. Therefore the defen­
dant’s auto insurer would, in fact, benefit from the plaintiff’s contract with the plaintiff’s 
health insurer.  This Note is not intended to decide whether or not this is justified. 
Rather, its focus is on the defendant, since the collateral source rule is intended to help 
deter him from risk-taking.  And the insurer getting a windfall has no bearing on the 
defendant’s behavior, or his pocket, because he will be surcharged by the same amount 
regardless. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
215. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 19 (stating that tort law “deter[s] certain 
kinds of conduct by imposing liability when that conduct causes harm”); see also supra 
note 16. 
216. 2 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 44-45 (discussing the possible effects of liability 
insurance and stating that “anyone can justifiably entertain the suspicion that the more 
insurance serves the compensation goal, the less it will serve the deterrence goal”). 
217. The whole deterrence idea rests on the presumption that a person will not 
engage in risk-taking if she is required to pay “full price” for her wrongdoing.  If how­
ever, the wrongdoer has to pay the same surcharge, whether her liability insurance paid 
the “full” or “discounted” price, paying a bigger award will not deter the tortfeasor any 
more effectively than a smaller one. 
218. See generally STEIN, supra note 2, § 13.3 (arguing that since the insured 
plaintiff did not have to pay for his own medical treatment, the compensatory goal of 
the tort system does not require the defendant to pay for it). This Note does not 
completely embrace that approach.  Rather than maintaining that the damage award 
should be offset by the collateral payment, this Note advocates that the payment should 
be introduced into evidence. 
219. See generally Nancy S. Marder, The Medical Malpractice Debate: The Jury as 
Scapegoat, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2005) (arguing that the notion that the 
32073-w
ne_34-2 S
heet N
o. 160 S
ide A
      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 160 Side A      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE212.txt unknown Seq: 33 13-AUG-12 12:16
 
 
2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 651 
sue of the plaintiff getting a “windfall,” but with the shortcomings 
of the collateral source rule, leading to overcompensation of some 
victims, while depriving others of adequate compensation.220  It is 
the assertion of this Note that the whole notion of “inevitable wind­
fall” is misplaced, because the “reasonable value” of a medical ser­
vice is not a magical number dreamed up in a vacuum; rather, it is a 
function of the totality of circumstances and, as such, may vary.  It 
is possible that a relatively modest award, influenced by evidence of 
low actual payments, is nevertheless still reasonable. Therefore, it 
is possible for the tortfeasor to pay the fair and reasonable value of 
the injury she caused, without overcompensating the victim. 
In short, a subjective, fact-based approach should be taken in 
order to determine the reasonable value of a service.  Indeed, such 
an approach may render different results for different victims, de­
pending on the terms of their health insurance. This brings the fo­
cus back to the problem that the defendant should not benefit from 
the victim’s contract with a third party insurer.221  The suggestion of 
this Note, however, is not that the collateral source payments 
should be subtracted from the award,222 nor that the award should 
be limited to the actual payments,223 but simply that the jury should 
be allowed to consider those payments when assessing the appro­
priate damages.  To that effect, the defendant will not directly reap 
civil juries tend to award excessive compensation and thereby exacerbate the medical 
malpractice “‘crisis’” is misguided); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American 
Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 849 (1998) (contending that 
juries are “excessively generous in awarding compensatory damages, and out of control 
when awarding punitive damages”); JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA AND THE 
CIVIL JUROR 175-96 (The Roscoe Pound Foundation 1988) (discussing the phenomenon 
of “ordinary people” awarding “mega-verdicts”). 
220. See supra Part V.B. 
221. See The Propeller Monticello v. Mollision, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 155 
(1854); Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66-67 (Cal. 1970); Law v. 
Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010); Shea v. Rettie, 192 N.E. 44, 45 (Mass. 1934). 
The notion of incidental benefit from a third party contract is articulated in Implement 
Serv., Inc. v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 726 F. Supp. 1171, 1182 n.9 (S.D. Ind., 1989) (stating 
that an “incidental beneficiary” is “one who benefits from the contracts of another, but 
whose benefit was not the intent of the contracting parties”). 
222. This approach was taken in the medical malpractice area. See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2010) (abrogating the collateral source rule in medical malprac­
tice and providing that the award should be offset by any collateral payments minus the 
premiums paid by the insured to secure those benefits). 
223. Such is the approach towards collateral source payments paid by Medi-Cal— 
California’s equivalent of MassHealth. See Hanif v. Hous. Auth. of Yolo Cnty., 246 Cal. 
Rptr. 192, 194-95, (Ct. App. 1988) (ruling that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover an 
amount larger than the actual payment for his medical service, so long as that amount is 
reasonable). 
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any “benefit” from the plaintiff’s contract.  At best, the tortfeasor 
may be indirectly advantaged, which is too speculative and tangen­
tial to be considered.224 
A possible critique of this subjective approach is the risk of 
implicit discrimination against recipients of government sponsored 
health insurance.225  While there is some merit to this concern, the 
same argument may be used in favor of the uninsured indigent pa­
tients, who would be disadvantaged by the exclusion of evidence of 
actual payments.226  In reality those two “classes” of patients (the 
MassHealth recipients and the uninsured poor) seem to bear mir­
roring risks.  If the collateral source rule is abolished, a MassHealth 
patient may indeed be viewed as a member of a marginal “class” 
but will not bear the risk of being under-compensated.  If the collat­
eral source rule stands, an uninsured indigent victim will not neces­
sarily be viewed by the jury as “poor” (because it will not know the 
victim could not afford insurance), but will most likely be under-
compensated, because the jury will assume he is insured.  Since the 
tort system is concerned more with compensating the victim227 and 
less with his economic appearance to the jury, it is fair to expect it 
to be more disturbed by potential under-compensation of the plain­
tiff than by the jury perceiving him as “poor.”  It is arguably correct 
that the “reasonable” value of a service is an indicator of the gravity 
of the plaintiff’s injury and therefore it affects the entire compensa­
tion of the victim.228  The jury, however, would hardly need to use 
this circumstantial evidence in order to determine the extent of the 
injury, since direct evidence and expert testimony as to the nature 
and severity of the injury are clearly admissible.229 
224. Speculative, because it is not clear whether a smaller award will prevent the 
defendant’s insurance from going up; tangential, because it concerns not only the con­
tract between the plaintiff and his health insurance, but also the contract between the 
defendant and her liability insurance. 
225. See Brief for the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellant, supra note 199, at *13. (arguing that allowing evidence for actual 
payments leads to “discriminatory legal treatment of the under privileged”). 
226. See supra Part V.A. 
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) (stating “the law of 
torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible 
equivalent to his position prior to the tort”). 
228. See Brief for The Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys as Amici Cu­
riae Supporting Appellant, supra note 199, at *18 (“[A]pplying a significantly lower 
price . . . gives the whole claim, including the pain and suffering aspect, an overall 
cheaper feel.”). 
229. See 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 244 (2002)  “Medical 
experts may permissibly testify as to the duration and permanency of injuries, including 
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2012] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE & HEALTH INSURANCE IN MASS. 653 
Another justification of the “windfall” for the plaintiff is the 
belief that the extra money would be used to offset other costs, in­
cluding attorney fees and future medical expenses.230  This asser­
tion, however, is also highly speculative and premised on the 
assumption that the jury will not adjust its award to allow for such 
costs and will necessarily under-compensate the victim.  In fact, 
eighty percent of the mock jurors in a study indicated that they dis­
cussed and factored the attorney fees the plaintiff would have had 
to pay in their damage assessment, even when they were not in­
structed to do so.231  Accordingly, the notion that it is permissible to 
offset those costs is misguided. 
D. Redressing Punitive Damages as Compensatory 
In addition to assessing the adequate compensation for the 
plaintiff, the common law rule permits the jury to award punitive 
damages.232  The jury, however, is not required to award such dam­
ages.233  One of the likely effects of the collateral source rule is to 
defeat the jury’s discretion and make it award punitive damages 
without realizing it. The Griffith court, for example, justified giving 
a windfall to the plaintiff by suggesting that the deterrent purpose 
of tort damages requires paying the “fair” (not discounted) value of 
the wrong that the defendant committed.234  The compensatory 
function of damage awards in Griffith would have been satisfied 
even if the defendant had had to pay only the sum of $16,387.00 
MassHealth paid.  Instead, the plaintiff sought to introduce the bills 
totaling $112,269.00 into evidence, and was allowed to do so.235  It is 
unclear how much the jury would have been likely to award on re­
mand, but, technically, the purpose of any amount over the actual 
sum paid is to deter and not to compensate.  As such, the extra 
amount fits within the definition of “punitive damages.”236 
such things as the effect of an injury on a person’s ability to work.” Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
230. See supra note 56. 
231. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 169. 
232. 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1062. 
233. Id. 
234. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) (“The purpose of the 
collateral source rule is tort deterrence.  The tortfeasor is required to compensate the 
injured party for the fair value of the harm caused, and is not to benefit from [the 
victim’s] contractual arrangements.”). 
235. Id. at 129. 
236. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (9th ed. 2009) (defining punitive dam­
ages as damages “assessed by way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example 
to others”); see also Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
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This approach is questionable for two reasons. First, it would 
duplicate the punitive damages that the defendant would have to 
pay or would substitute them (if the jury chooses not to award puni­
tive damages).237  Second, it ignores the fact that the defendant’s 
liability insurance might ultimately pay the bill and that, as a result, 
the economic effect on the defendant would be, at best, indirect.238 
Generally, punitive damages are not covered by liability insur­
ance.239  When the damages are labeled “compensatory,” however, 
they would be paid by the insurer, leading to overcompensating the 
victim without effectively deterring the wrongdoer, and simultane­
ously contributing to higher liability insurance premiums. 
It appears that the collateral source rule, applied in the context 
of Massachusetts personal injury cases, can confuse the jury in 
many aspects.  The rule does not allow the jury to know if the plain­
tiff had health insurance, and it fosters a reasonable presumption 
that he was insured.  It disallows evidence of actual payments and 
thereby makes it highly likely that the jury will either under-com­
pensate the plaintiff or grant him a windfall.  Often the rule may 
lead the jury to believe it is compensating the plaintiff, while it is, in 
fact, punishing the tortfeasor.  In the meantime, the rule provides 
no real benefit to any party, other than to a plaintiff whose insur­
ance negotiated exceptionally low rates with the health care pro­
vider.  This was the case in Law v. Griffith, and as a result, the 
plaintiff could have ultimately walked out of the courtroom with 
$95,882.76—the difference between what her insurer paid for her 
treatment and what her medical provider billed the insurer. 
CONCLUSION 
The collateral source rule should be repealed in Massachusetts, 
because in a state where both health insurance and liability insur­
ance are mandatory, the traditional rationales for the rule are irre­
2006) (stating that “[i]n many respects, the [collateral source] rule is punitive”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
237. Awarding punitive damages generally requires that the defendant act with 
“recklessness, malice, or deceit.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (9th ed. 2009). From 
the facts in Griffith, it does not seem that the defendant’s conduct rose to that level. 
238. See discussion supra Part C.1. 
239. See, e.g., Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 556 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. 1990) 
(ruling that punitive damages are not recoverable under either of both defendants’ in­
surance policies”); see also Insurability of Punitive Damages, MCCULLOUGH, CAMP­
BELL & LANE LLP (2004) http://www.mcandl.com/puni_frame.html (stating that 
“[t]ypically, courts that have concluded that punitive damages ought not to be 
insurable”). 
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versibly antiquated.  The rule does not effectively serve to deter the 
wrongdoer, because her liability insurance pays for the damage.  It 
does not guarantee adequate compensation of the victim, as it cre­
ates the risk of under-compensating some plaintiffs, while overcom­
pensating others.  Since the rule is counterintuitive when insurance 
is presumed, it does not prevent jury confusion but instead exacer­
bates it. 
Overall, the shortcomings of the collateral source rule in Mas­
sachusetts significantly outweigh its benefits.  Moreover, concerns, 
such as the risk that a jury would under-evaluate an insured plain­
tiff’s injury, are more appropriately addressed with jury instruc­
tions,240 rather than by “blindfolding” the jury. For all these 
reasons, the rule should be abrogated and the jury should be al­
lowed to factor the actual payments of medical expenses into its 
compensatory damages award. 
While mystifying the behavior of a character like Oscar Wilde’s 
Lady Alroy adds dramatism and suspense to a literary piece, ob­
scuring a plaintiff’s insurance in Massachusetts has no such creative 
value.  Made obsolete by our contemporary reality, the collateral 
source rule serves no meaningful purpose; it simply perpetuates the 
“mystery” of a Sphinx without a secret. 
Tsvetelina Gerova-Wilson* 
240. See LAURENCE H. GELLER & PETER  HEMENWAY, THE  JUROR’S  LONELY 
QUEST: LAST CHANCE FOR JUSTICE 289 (NCDS Press 1977) (stating that “jury instruc­
tions, properly and promptly given, can make the law understandable and have tremen­
dous potential for empowering jurors and for streamlining our current system”). 
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2012. I would like to 
thank my husband Dave for his unconditional support and patience, and my family and 
friends, both in Bulgaria and in the United States, who believe in me even more than I 
sometimes believe in myself.  I am also thankful to Professor Barbara Noah for her 
helpful suggestions and comments and to Western New England Law Review for giving 
me the honor to be part of this amazing team. 
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